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Global trade fell 30 percent relative to GDP during the Great Recession of 2008-2009. Did this collapse
result from factors impeding international transactions or did it simply reflect the greater severity of
the recession in highly traded sectors? We answer this question with detailed international data, interpreted
within a general-equilibrium trade model. Counterfactual simulations of the model show that a shift
in spending away from manufactures, particularly durables, accounts for more than 80 percent of the
drop in trade/GDP. Increased trade impediments reduced trade in some countries, but globally the
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Global trade plunged by nearly 30 percent relative to GDP during the Great Recession of
2008-2009. The four panels of Figure 1 plot the average of imports and exports relative
to GDP for the four largest economies in the world: the United States, Japan, China, and
Germany. Trade/GDP fell sharply in each of these countries since 2008. This large drop in
international trade has generated signi￿cant attention and concern. For example, Eichen-
green (2009) writes, ￿The collapse of trade since the summer of 2008 has been absolutely
terrifying, more so insofar as we lack an adequate understanding of its causes.￿ 1
Given traded goods sectors such as durable manufactures are procyclical, one explanation
is that trade fell relative to GDP due to the changing composition of global output in the
recession. Another is that increasing trade frictions at the international border, broadly
de￿ned, might be the culprit. This paper investigates the relative contributions of these two
hypotheses, both globally and at the country level.
Our conclusion is that the bulk of the decline in international trade is attributable to
the decline in the share of demand for tradables. Changes in demand for durable manu-
factures alone accounted for about 65 percent of the cross-country variation in changes in
manufacturing trade/GDP from the ￿rst quarter of 2008 to the ￿rst quarter of 2009, four
quarters encompassing the steep decline in trade. The decline in total manufacturing de-
mand (durables and non-durables) accounted for more than 80 percent of the global decline
in trade/GDP in 2008 and 2009.
The decline in trade for some countries (and between some country pairs) did exceed what
one would expect simply from the changing composition of demand. Hence, increasing trade
frictions independently contributed to the troubles facing the global economy and played an
important role in some countries, particularly China and Japan. Our calculations suggest,
however, that other countries saw reductions in trade frictions over this period. Globally,
these e⁄ects largely cancel out. When we perform related calculations on data from the
Great Depression, we ￿nd very di⁄erent evidence, suggesting a dramatic increase in trade
frictions for the United States in the early 1930s.
Our analytic tool for this investigation is a multi-sector model of production and trade,
1International Economy (2009) asks in its symposium on the collapse, ￿World trade has been falling
faster than global GDP ￿indeed, faster than at any time since the Great Depression. How is this possible?￿
Dozens of researchers pose various hypotheses in Baldwin (2009).
1calibrated to sectoral data on output and bilateral trade from recent quarters. We run coun-
terfactuals to determine what the path of trade would have been without the shift in demand
away from the manufacturing sectors and without the increase in trade frictions.2 Our ap-
proach also allows us to decompose the extent to which what happened to an individual
country was the consequence of (i) shocks hitting it directly and (ii) shocks hitting other
countries transmitted to it through trade.
We proceed as follows. The next section reviews some major explanations that have
been o⁄ered for the recent trade collapse. Section 3 reviews some basic evidence on what
happened to trade and manufacturing production over the recent period. Section 4 presents
a framework to make use of this evidence to quantify the contributions of various shocks to
the collapse of GDP. Section 5 explains how we take this framework to the data. We then, in
Section 6, decompose what happened through the examination of various counterfactuals in
which various shocks are suppressed. As a ￿nal exercise, in Section 7 we compare the recent
experience to the declines in trade during the 2001 U.S. recession and during the great Great
Depression. Section 8 concludes.
2 Trade Decline: Hypotheses
The literature o⁄ers various explanations for the decline in trade ￿ ows relative to overall
economic activity. Levchenko et al. (2010) use U.S. data to show that the recent decline in
trade is large relative to previous recessions. They document the relative decline in demand
for tradables, particularly durable goods.3
Bems et al. (2010) combine Leontief preferences and technologies with the input-output
structure from Johnson and Noguera (2009) to link changes in ￿nal demand during the recent
recession to changes in trade ￿ ows throughout the global system. This work suggests that
the changing composition of GDP can largely account for the decline in trade relative to
GDP.4
2Just as growth accounting uses a theoretical framework to decompose output growth into the growth
of labor and capital inputs as well as the Solow residual, we use our model to decompose changes in trade
￿ ows into factors such as changes in trade frictions and the composition of demand. Closer to Chari et al.
(2007) ￿wedges￿ approach to business cycle accounting, our decomposition relies on model-based general
equilibrium counterfactual responses to various shocks.
3Engel and Wang (2009) also stress the di⁄erent cyclical properties of durables and non-durables, both
generally as well as during the recent recession.
4A pair of ￿rm-level analyses for European countries support the view that a shift in the composition
2Other work suggests that trade frictions or phenomena that increase home-bias, are of
￿rst-order importance. For instance, given that many economies￿banking systems have
been in crisis, one leading hypothesis is that a collapse in trade credit has contributed
to the breakdown in trade. Amiti and Weinstein (2010) demonstrate that the health of
Japanese ￿rms￿banks signi￿cantly a⁄ected the ￿rms￿export activity, presumably through
their role in issuing trade credit. Using U.S. trade data during the recent episode, Chor and
Manova (2009) show that sectors requiring greater ￿nancing saw a greater decline in trade
volume. McKinnon (2009) and Bhagwati (2009) also focus on the role of reduced trade credit
availability in explaining the recent trade collapse.
Others note that protectionist measures have exerted an extra drag on trade. Brock
(2009) writes, ￿...many political leaders ￿nd the old habits of protectionism irresistible ...
This, then, is a large part of the answer to the question as to why world trade has been
collapsing faster than world GDP.￿Another hypothesis is that, since trade ￿ ows are mea-
sured in gross rather than value added terms, a disintegration of international vertical supply
chains may be driving the decline. Eichengreen (2009) writes, ￿The most important factor
is probably the growth of global supply chains, which has magni￿ed the impact of declining
￿nal demand on trade,￿and a similar hypothesis is found in Yi (2009). In addition, dynamics
associated with the inventory cycle may be generating disproportionately severe contractions
in trade, as in Alessandria et al. (2010a, 2010b). Finally, ￿scal stimulus measures imple-
mented worldwide may be home-biased due to political pressures on government purchases.
All of these potential disruptions can be broadly construed as re￿ ecting international trade
frictions, where some factor is directly a⁄ecting goods which cross the international border
per se.
Papers such as Levchenko et al., Chor and Manova, and Amiti and Weinstein analyze
data from a single country in partial equilibrium, but they are able to use highly disag-
gregated data which allow for clean identi￿cation of various e⁄ects. We view our work as
complementary to these country-speci￿c empirical studies. Our framework has the bene￿t
of being able to evaluate hypotheses for the trade decline in a multi-country quantitative
of demand, rather than a collapse of trade credit or of global supply chains, was behind the decline in
trade. Behrens et al. (2010), looking at the imports and exports of Belgian ￿rms, ￿nd that trade in
consumer durables and in capital goods fell much more than in other products, while ￿nancial factors and
participation in supply chains a⁄ected domestic and foreign activity in proportion. Bricongne et al. (2010),
looking at exports of French ￿rms, ￿nd that those involved in durable goods were much more a⁄ected by
the crisis, although they also ￿nd that dependence on external ￿nance mattered.
3general equilibrium model.
3 A First Look at the Data
Before turning to our analytic framework for disentangling the forces driving the decline
in trade, we look at some of the key variables to see how much of what happened during
the Great Recession represents a departure from previous experience.5 We ￿rst look at how
trade relative to GDP relates to real GDP growth over the last 50 years. We then turn to
how spending on manufactures, which constitute the major component of trade for most
OECD countries, varies with GDP over the same period. Finally, we look at the relationship
between trade in manufactures and manufacturing production over the last decade. These
relationships in the raw data lie underneath the results of our subsequent calibration exercise.
3.1 Trade and GDP
Is the decline in trade relative to GDP during the Great Recession anomalous or just the
manifestation of a business cycle regularity? To get a handle on the answer, Figure 2 plots
four-quarter changes in non-oil imports relative to GDP against the change in real GDP
for the United States, Japan, China, and Germany from the ￿rst quarter of 1960 (1960:Q1)
through 2009:Q4.6 The Great Recession observations appear as solid squares and the others
as hollow circles. We include regression lines based on the observations prior to the Great
Recession. Note that, for the United States and Germany, the slope of the line is distinctly
positive and that the observations for the Great Recession lie close to the regression line
based on the prior period. They are, of course, at the lower left-hand tail, re￿ ecting the
fact that the Great Recession was the worst recession in the period. For Japan and China,
however, there is little or no relationship between imports and GDP in the earlier years.
So the decline in trade/GDP that these countries experienced during the Great Recession
5Appendix A describes the data used throughout the paper. We take most data, such as input-output
elasticities, monthly trade ￿ ows, and annual production levels, directly from international sources. In addi-
tion, we construct our own monthly indicators for industrial production and producer prices in the durable
and non-durable sectors by taking a weighted average of the equivalent indicators from more disaggregated
sectors. Finally, we use a procedure, described in Appendix A, called temporal disaggregation, to extract
internally-consistent monthly production data using these monthly indicators and annual production data.
6Throughout this paper, we deal with seasonality by examining four-quarter changes in the data. Due to
data limitations, China￿ s plot is of manufacturing imports relative to GDP (and is manufacturing production
relative to GDP in Appendix Figure 1).
4represents a departure from previous patterns.
3.2 Manufacturing and GDP
To consider the potential role of composition e⁄ects, we similarly examine the four-quarter
changes in the share of spending on manufactures relative to changes in real GDP for the same
four countries over the same period, separating the Great Recession from other observations
as above.7 For all four countries the slope, based on the earlier period, is positive, with the
Great Recession observations not appearing anomalous.
3.3 Trade and Manufacturing Production: The Head-Ries Index
For some countries, at least, a decline in trade and a decline in spending on manufactures
are symptomatic of a recession. To what extent did trade in manufactures decline by more
than what we would expect given the decline in spending on manufactures? To get some
handle on the answer we calculate an indicator of trade frictions between individual country
pairs. To our knowledge the indicator ￿rst appears in Head and Ries (2001), so we refer to
it as the Head-Ries index.








n is a vector of destination characteristics, ZE
i a vector of source characteristics
(where GDP is often used for each), and ￿ni ￿ 1 an indicator of the frictions thwarting
exports from i to n (often proxied by distance). Assume that the relationship applies to











Note that this measure extracts (inversely) the pure trade friction component of the gravity
equation (although it can￿ t distinguish directional elements in them).8 We calculate the
7These relationships are plotted in Appendix Figure 1.
8The index is invariant to scale or to the relative size and productivity of trading partners, unlike simpler
measures such as the ratio of imports or exports to production. Head and Ries (2001) use the index, equation
(8) in their paper, to measure the border e⁄ect on trade between the United States and Canada for several
5index separately for durable and non-durable manufactures by using trade data to obtain
Xni for n 6= i and data on production and exports to calculate Xii over the period 2000:Q1
through 2009:Q4 for the 22 countries listed in Table 1.9
Figure 3 plots the six bilateral Head-Ries indices involving the United States, Japan,
China, and Germany, separating durables and non-durables.10 If trade frictions increased
during the Great Recession then we should notice a decline in the index during the last several
quarters. The results are mixed. In the relationships in which Germany participates there is
no notable decline, with the index for non-durables sometimes rising. For these relationships
the recession seemed to apply to domestic activity (the denominator of (1)) as much or more
than to foreign transactions (the numerator of (1)). For some of the relationships involving
China or Japan, however, the indices decline markedly starting in 2008.
Figure 4 summarizes the trend in trade frictions at the country level. We estimate
country-time ￿xed e⁄ects from a pooled regression of ln￿ni, weighting observations by the
value of the numerator of (1) in 2008:Q1 in order to emphasize more important trading
partners. Consistent with plots of the bilateral relationships, we see that the recession did
not imply large increases in trade frictions for the United States and Germany, while there
is a steep increase in trade frictions for Japan and China. Looking across all the countries in
our data, the time ￿xed e⁄ects decreased in exactly half of them for durable manufacturing
and slightly less than half for non-durable manufacturing between 2008:Q1 and 2009:Q1.
Our conclusion is that changes in trade frictions appear to be quite heterogenous across
countries, and are often relatively muted.
These simple summary relationships suggest that both a general decline in spending on
manufactures and, for at least some countries, an increase in trade frictions, may account for
the trade collapse. To assess the quantitative contribution of each, as well as of other poten-
tial factors, we turn to our framework for combining these di⁄erent sources of information
into a model.
manufacturing industries. Jacks et al. (2009) study a very similar object for a span of over 100 years to
analyze long-term changes in trade frictions. Also see Anderson and Yotov (2009) for related estimates of
bilateral trade frictions.
9Country n￿ s purchases of domesticly produced goods, Xnn, is equal to gross production less exports:
Xnn = Yn ￿
P
i6=n Xin.
10In order to minimize seasonal e⁄ects, Figure 3 as well as Figure 4 below plot four-quarter moving
averages.
64 A Framework to Analyze the Global Recession
Our general equilibrium framework builds on Eaton and Kortum (2002), Lucas and Alvarez
(2008), and Dekle et al. (2008). Our setup is most closely related to recent work by Caliendo
and Parro (2009), which uses a multi-sector generalization of these models to study the
impact of NAFTA.
We start by describing the input-output structure. Next, we merge this structure with
a model of bilateral trade. We treat some parameters of the model as ￿xed over time
while allowing others to vary, but for ease of exposition, we omit time subscripts until that
distinction becomes relevant.
4.1 Demand and Input-Output Structure
Consider a world of i = 1;:::;I countries with constant return to scale production and
perfectly competitive markets. There are three sectors indexed by j: durable manufacturing
(j = D), non-durable manufacturing (j = N), and non-manufacturing (j = S). The label S
was chosen because ￿services￿are a large share of non-manufacturing, although our category
also includes agriculture, petroleum and other raw materials. We let ￿ = fD;N;Sg denote
all sectors and ￿M = fD;Ng denote the manufacturing sectors.
We model international trade explicitly only for the manufacturing sectors. Net trade in
the S sector is exogenous in our framework. Within manufactures, we distinguish between
durables and non-durables because these two groups have been characterized by shocks of
di⁄erent sizes, as documented in Levchenko et al. (2009).
Let Y
j
i denote country i￿ s gross production in sector j 2 ￿, X
j




















Denoting GDP by Y F
i , aggregate ￿nal spending is XF
i = Y F
i +Di. The relationship between
GDP and sectoral gross outputs depends on the input-output structure, to which we now
7turn.
Sectoral outputs are used both as inputs into production and to satisfy ￿nal demand. We
assume a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of sectoral inputs.11 Value-added is a share ￿
j
i of gross
production in sector j of country i, while ￿
jl
i denotes the share of sector l in intermediates




i = 1 for each j 2 ￿.12





















Finally, we denote by ￿
j
i the share of sector j0s output in country i￿ s aggregate ￿nal demand.

















To interpret (3), consider the case of durables manufacturing, j = D. The ￿rst term
on the right-hand side represents the ￿nal demand for durables. A decline in ￿D
i represents
a disproportionate drop in ￿nal spending on durables in country i (whether purchased by
consumers or by ￿rms as investment goods). The second term captures demand for durable
manufactures as intermediate inputs. The total demand for durable manufactures in country
i, XD
i ; is just their sum.
De￿ne the 3-by-3 matrix ￿i of input-output coe¢ cients, with ￿
lj
i (1 ￿ ￿
l
i) in the l￿ th row

































i are input bundles used to produce sector j output. Here l
j
i is labor input in sector j, and y
jl
i is
sector-l intermediate input used in sector-j production.
12Input-output tables o⁄er support for our Cobb-Douglas assumption. Appendix Figure 2 shows that the
￿ and ￿ values in several large economies remained quite stable from 2000 to 2005.
13Our analysis could be interpreted as allowing for an arbitrary number of sectorally-mobile factors as
long as factor intensity doesn￿ t di⁄er across sectors.
8and j￿ th column, where we￿ ve ordered the sectors as D, N, and S. We can now stack
equations (3) for each value of j and write the linear system:







i is the transpose of ￿i and the boldface variables Xi, Yi, Di, and ￿i are 3-by-1
vectors with each element containing the corresponding variable for sectors D, N, and S.
For now we take wages wi and sectoral prices pl
i for l 2 ￿, as given. The Cobb-Douglas




















4.2 Folding Non-Manufacturing into Manufacturing
As noted above, we do not explicitly model trade in sector S. We now reformulate the model
so that the S sector equilibrates only in the background, allowing us to focus on equilibrium
in durables D and non-durables N:
We specify country i￿ s labor productivity in sector S as AS






























Substituting this expression for the price of non-manufactures back into the cost functions
expressions (5) for j 2 ￿M, we can treat the manufacturing sectors as if they had integrated
the production of all non-manufacturing intermediates into their operations. Some algebra
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i captures the pecuniary spillover from non-manufacturing productivity to sector
j costs. The parameter e ￿
j
i is the share of value added used directly in sector j as well as
the value added embodied in non-manufacturing intermediates used by sector j. The share
of manufacturing intermediates is 1￿ e ￿
j
i, with e ￿
jl
i representing the share of manufacturing






Substituting out the non-manufacturing sector leaves, in place of (3), two sectoral demand
equations for each country, one for each j 2 ￿M:
X
j
i = e ￿
j






































All that remains of the non-manufacturing sector is its trade de￿cit, which we treat as
exogenous. Thus, in the remainder of the paper, j refers to j 2 ￿M.
4.3 International Trade
Any country￿ s production in either manufacturing sector must be absorbed by demand from
other countries or from itself. De￿ne ￿
j
ni as the share of country n￿ s expenditures on goods











We adopt the framework in Eaton and Kortum (2002) to model the determinants of ￿
j
ni:
Durable and non-durable manufactures consist of disjoint unit measures of di⁄erentiated
goods, indexed by zj. Country i￿ s e¢ ciency making good zj is ai(zj) so that the cost of




i is the cost of an input bundle, given by
(6).
Making the standard iceberg assumption about trade costs, that delivering one unit of a
good in sector j from country i to country n requires shipping d
j
ni ￿ 1 units, with d
j
ii = 1,








Each country purchases each di⁄erentiated good zj from the lowest cost source, hence the









Country i￿ s e¢ ciency ai(zj) in making good zj is the realization of a random variable
with distribution: F
j
i (a) = Pr[ai(zj) ￿ a] = e￿T
j
i a￿￿j
, drawn independently across i and zj.
Here T
j
i > 0 is a parameter that re￿ ects country i￿ s overall e¢ ciency in producing any good








j is an inverse measure of the dispersion of e¢ ciencies.
We assume that the individual manufacturing goods, whether used as intermediates or in
￿nal demand, are combined in a constant-elasticity-of-substitution aggregator, with elasticity




















where ’j is a function of ￿
j and ￿j, requiring ￿





























































captures the combined e⁄ect on costs of technology in manufacturing sector j and productiv-
ity in sector S on the price index for good j. Expression (11) links sector-j prices in country
n to the prices of labor and intermediates around the world.






























n.14 We can use (10) and (6) to












































We can now express the conditions for global equilibrium. Substituting (9) into (7) we obtain
input-output equations linking spending in each manufacturing sector around the world:
X
j
i = e ￿
j








































14This expression gives back the Head-Ries index (1) by setting ￿ni = (dni)
￿ :
12Following Alvarez and Lucas (2007), we make world GDP numeraire. The model accounts
for country-level GDP relative to the global total. Given the shares of ￿nal demand ￿
j
i,
de￿cits Di and DS
i , trade frictions d
j
ni, productivity terms A
j






i for each country i = 1;:::;I and for manufacturing sector j, the
equilibrium is a set of wages wi, spending levels X
j
i , price levels p
j
i, and trade shares ￿
j
ni that
solve equations (11), (12), (13), and (14). Production, de￿cits, and employment by country
for each sector j are then given by (9).
4.5 The Model￿ s Four Shocks
We now turn to how we account for changes in trade/GDP over the recent period. We treat
the distribution parameters ￿
j, the value-added shares ￿
j
i, and the input-output coe¢ cients
￿
jl
i as ￿xed over time. We then attribute changes in equilibrium outcomes to four types of
shocks which we treat as exogenous: (i) shocks to sector j￿ s share in the ￿nal spending of
country i, ￿
j
i, (ii) shocks to the frictions in exporting goods of type j from i to n, d
j
ni, (iii)
shocks to country i￿ s productivity in sector j, A
j
i, and (iv) changes in country i￿ s overall and
non-manufacturing de￿cits Di and DS
i .15
The ￿rst category of shocks are to the shares ￿
j
i of ￿nal demand spent on sector-j goods
in country i. For example, (i) consumers putting o⁄ buying cars, (ii) ￿rms postponing
investment, or (iii) a reduction in durable inventories would appear as declines in the ￿D
i ￿ s.
The hypothesis that shifts in the patterns of overall demand during the Great Recession led
to the trade collapse attributes it to a drop in the ￿
j
i￿ s.
The second set of shocks are to trade frictions d
j
ni. Anything causing a reduction in
absorption of imports relative to absorption of domestic production map into an increase in
the d
j
ni￿ s. Examples are (i) hikes in the cost of shipping cross-country (relative to shipping
domestically), (ii) tari⁄increases, (iii) the ￿Buy America￿provision in the U.S. ￿scal stimulus
15We relate the trade shocks and productivity shocks to the price index (11) and trade share expression
(12) from the Ricardian model developed above. But any model generating these two aggregate equations
would work for our analysis. These same expressions emerge in, among others, the Armington (1969) model
elaborated in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), the Krugman (1980) model implemented in Redding and
Venables (2004), the Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002), and the Melitz (2003) model expanded
in Chaney (2008). In the Armington setup, for example, one would simply re-interpret shocks to A
j
i as
preference shocks for that country￿ s goods. For instance, a world-wide change in the taste for cars produced
in Japan would map into a reduction in Japan￿ s durable-good productivity in our framework. Arkolakis
et al. (2009) emphasize the striking similarity in the trade patterns implied by such seemingly disparate
models.
13package, (iv) di¢ culties in obtaining trade ￿nance relative to other types of credit, as in
Amiti and Weinstein (2010) and Chor and Manova (2009), and (v) greater adjustment of
inventories of imports relative to those of domestically-produced goods, as in Alessandria et
al. (2010b).16
The third set of shocks A
j
i relate to each country￿ s productivity in durables and in non-
durables (taking into account the e⁄ects of changes in productivity in non-manufacturing




i enter both (11) and (12) as a
ratio to each other. Hence a decrease in d
j
ni or an increase in A
j
i have the same e⁄ect in
reducing the price index in a destination market n or increasing the trade share of country
i at destination n: To separate the e⁄ect of A
j
i we use our normalization that d
j
ii = 1 for all









































Given prices, an increase in A
j
i raises the share of goods that country i buys from itself as
well as what other countries buy from it. A drop in d
j
ni for n 6= i just increases what country
n buys from it.
The ￿nal set of shocks in our model are the de￿cits. In particular, equilibrium is a
function of each country￿ s overall de￿cit Di and its non-manufacturing de￿cit DS
i . Since our
model is static, it doesn￿ t incorporate the intertemporal trade-o⁄s that determine de￿cits.
Hence we simply feed in the de￿cits that actually occurred.
The demand shocks and trade friction shocks correspond to the two types of explanations
that have been given for the decline in trade relative to GDP. We have no reason to think that
productivity shocks or de￿cits had a systematic e⁄ect on what happened to trade relative to
GDP during the Great Recession (and we ￿nd that they mostly don￿ t) but we need to take
them into account to calculate the general equilibrium of the world economy. To economize
on the parameter values and data that we need to calibrate our model, we reformulate it in
terms of changes over time.




144.6 The Model in Changes
Denote the beginning-of-period or baseline value of any time-varying variable as x and its
end-of-period or counterfactual value as x0, with the change over the period (or counterfactual
change) denoted ^ x = x0=x. Since output is payment to labor, Y F
i = wiLi, the assumption




￿0 = ^ wiY F
i . (As we discuss below, little changes
if instead we take into account the actual changes in Li.)
In terms of counterfactual levels and changes, the global input-output equations (13), for















































































































































































Equations (16), (17), (18), and (19) determine the changes in endogenous variables im-
plied by a given set of shocks. We solve this set of equations for: (i) changes in wages ^ wi,
(ii) counterfactual levels of spending (X
j
i )0, (iii) changes in prices ^ p
j



















i, as well as changes in in trade frictions
^ d
j
ni and productivities ^ A
j
i.17 We use actual baseline trade shares ￿
j
ni and GDP￿ s Y F
i to cali-
17As described in Appendix B, equilibrium outcomes for everything but price changes are invariant to labor-
15brate the model. The only parameters required are the ￿
j￿ s and the input-output coe¢ cients
underlying the e ￿
l
i￿ s and the e ￿
jl
i ￿ s.
We solve the system as follows. Given a vector of possible wage changes b wi￿ s, we solve
(18) for price changes ^ p
j






via (19). Given counterfactual trade shares and wage changes, we solve (16) as a linear






. If these levels of spending satisfy (17),
then we have an equilibrium. If not, we adjust wage changes according to where there is
excess demand (with world GDP ￿xed) and return to (18). Appendix C describes the details
of the solution algorithm.18
5 Backing Out the Shocks
In the previous section we described how to solve for changes in the equilibrium outcomes
(wages, spending, prices, and trade shares) given the four types of shocks. We now invert
this relationship to back out the shocks from observed outcomes. We use a panel of 22
countries for which we have data on input-output structure, production, and exports, as well
as a residual category ROW, for ￿Rest of World.￿In 2008 our 22 countries account for about
75 percent of global manufacturing trade and of world GDP. Table 1 lists the countries, their
shares of global GDP and global trade, and trade/GDP.19 We work at a quarterly frequency,
sometimes aggregating up from monthly data.20 We set ￿
D = ￿
N = 2, a value between the
smaller values typically used in the open-economy macro literature and the larger values
used in Eaton and Kortum (2002).21 Below, we go through how we back out the four types
of shocks and provide some evidence on each.





i for some ￿ > 0. Such shocks lead to price changes equal to
1=￿. Furthermore, equilibrium outcomes are invariant to shocks to non-manufacturing sector productivity,
given ^ A
j
i. These con￿gurations of productivity shocks a⁄ect welfare, but are irrelevant to the model￿ s
implications for international trade.

















. We can then use
equation (9), as it applies to the counterfactual levels, to solve separetely for durable and non-durable
output.
19Here and for the rest of the paper, we use the term ￿trade￿to refer to the average of imports and exports
of manufactured goods.
20Appendix A describes our sources and procedures to generate our dataset.
21Our qualitative conclusion that demand shocks were the primary driver of the decline in trade/GDP are




We extract the vector of demand shocks for country i; ￿i; from data on absorption by sector
Xi, output by sector Yi, ￿nal spending XF
i , and the input-output coe¢ cients determining











Figure 5 plots the paths of ￿D
i and ￿N
i for four large countries since 2000, with the dashed
vertical lines highlighting 2008:Q1 to 2009:Q1. The recent recession accompanied a steep
decline in the share of ￿nal demand for manufactures in all these countries, particularly for
durables. For most countries this share begins to increase again toward the end of 2009. We
use beginning-of-period values as ￿
j








Overall and non-manufacturing trade de￿cits Di and DS
i enter the model in equations (16)
and (17). We take them directly from the data, calculating the de￿cits for ROW to make
the global de￿cits zero.
De￿cits changed dramatically over the recession. Figure 6 shows overall and non-manufacturing
trade de￿cits for several major countries. The sharp reduction in the overall U.S. trade de￿cit
during the recession is balanced by reduced surpluses for Japan, Germany, and China. As
with demand shocks, in solving the model in terms of changes we use beginning-of-period
values as Di and DS






22We impute non-manufacturing production as: Y S









i from (2). For ROW,
we ￿rst need to construct sectoral production for j 2 ￿M. We start by averaging sectoral value added as a





i across the 22 countries in our sample. We then multiply the result by Y F
ROW to
estimate value added by sector for ROW. We divide by ￿
j
ROW to estimate Y
j
ROW, where we take ￿
j
ROW as
the median value of ￿
j
i across the 22 countries in our sample.
23We insert these demand shocks and input-output coe¢ cients into (8) to construct the e ￿
j
i in equation



































































ii we simply use the change in home share in demand for country i in absorption of
good j: Since in our model GDP is simply wiLi and we treat Li as ￿xed, we use the change in
country i￿ s GDP to infer b wi.24 Finally, we use the sectoral PPI data described in Appendix
A to infer the b p
j
i.
Figure 7 presents the productivity shocks, by sector, for the four large economies over
2000-2009. Note that the Great Recession is characterized by noticeable drops in productivity
in Germany and Japan and by continuing productivity growth in China.
5.4 Trade Frictions
To get the b d
j
ni we divide both sides of (19) by ￿
j
ni to get ^ ￿
j
ni. Dividing by the corresponding
expression for ^ ￿
j






















We implement this equation using data on the changes in trade shares ^ ￿
j
ni and changes in
sectoral PPI￿ s.25












as calculated in (22), yields the
24We have examined for several countries how our productivity measures would di⁄er if we take into
account employment changes. While there is more productivity growth in the earlier period there is little
that changes during the Great Recession. Except for the di⁄erent inference about productivity shocks, taking
into account employment changes makes no di⁄erence for the rest of our analysis. These results are available
by request from the authors.
25We need data on the price indices to separate changes in productivity and in trade frictions. We do not
need these price data to back out the demand shocks (or, of course, the de￿cits). Appendix B shows an
alternative decomposition into demand shocks, de￿cits, and a third shock which is a complicated combination
of the sectoral productivity and trade friction shocks. This third shock can be backed out without making
use of price data. We didn￿ t pursue this alternative decomposition because it doesn￿ t isolate the trade friction
shocks that we are interested in. We emphasize, though, that what we have to say about the contribution of
demand shocks and de￿cits, as well as the combined contribution of trade frictions and productivity shocks,
to the Great Recession doesn￿ t rely on these price data. Price data only a⁄ect how we disentangle trade
friction and productivity shocks.
18formula for the change in the Head-Ries index (1). Thus, the plots of the Head-Ries indices
summarize the behavior of the trade-friction shocks. Figures 3 and 4 reveal that evidence
on trade frictions is a mixed bag.26 The heterogeneity across country pairs makes it hard
to determine their importance. To quantify their contribution, we turn to counterfactual
exercises that map the various shocks into the outcomes of interest.
6 Counterfactuals
Our counterfactual simulations measure the contribution of various subsets of the shocks to
the decline in trade over the Great Recession. To proceed, we de￿ne the set of all shocks, in


























for all countries i;n 2 I and sectors j 2 ￿M.27 For any given four-quarter period and any
given set of shocks b s, we can solve equations (16), (17), (18), and (19) for changes over that
period in the endogenous variables (production, trade, and GDP).
While we can perform counterfactuals using any values of b s that we want, we limit
ourselves to either the actual values backed out from the data or else the value 1, eliminating
any contribution from that shock. At one extreme, setting all elements in b s to 1, meaning
that all shocks are constant over the period, delivers the outcome of no change. At the
other, setting all the elements in b s equal to the values backed out from the data delivers
the outcome that actually happened. More interesting are the cases in between in which a
subset of shocks take on the values backed out from the data, with the others set to 1. Such
a counterfactual isolates the contribution of that subset of shocks to what happened.28
We decompose the shocks in two di⁄erent ways. First, to assess the role of each set























) equal to the values backed out from the data for all
26Appendix Figure 4 presents histograms of trade-friction shocks across all country pairs constructed
according to equation (22). Over the period 2008:Q1 to 2009:Q1 most of the mass in the distributions lies
below one, indicating that trade frictions typically increased over this period.
27For notational consistency with the other shocks we write b DS
i and b Di. The cases of DS
i = 0 or Di = 0







28Because of the non-linearity of the model, the contributions of individual shocks to a change needn￿ t
add up to the actual change. Since a ￿change￿means the ratio of the counterfactual value to its baseline
value, ￿adding up￿means summing the logarithms of such ratios.
19countries, with all the other three types of shocks set to 1. We further di⁄erentiate between
shocks to the durables and non-durables sectors. The solution tells us how much trade
relative to GDP would have fallen if only that one type of shock had occurred.
Second, to assess the role of international interactions, we ask how much various outcomes
for each country were the consequence of shocks transmitted to it through the re-equilibration
of world markets versus shocks it experienced directly. Denote the shocks in which country
i appears as b si and the shocks in which it does not appear as b s￿i. We ￿rst solve the model
setting b s￿i to the shocks backed out from the data and b si to 1. We then do the reverse. The
￿rst exercise tells us what just foreign shocks would have done and the second what just
domestic shocks would have done.
6.1 Accounting for Trade/GDP: 2006-2009
We start by considering a series of four-quarter changes, beginning with 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q1
and ending with 2008:Q4 to 2009:Q4. We run the model for each of these four-quarter periods
(twelve in total). Figure 8 plots the results at the global level, with the ending quarter on
the x-axis and the change in trade/GDP from the same quarter the previous year (with 1
indicating no change) on the y-axis.29
The boldface black line labeled ￿Data￿plots the actual changes (what emerges setting
all shocks to those backed out from the data). After modest growth through 2007, global
manufacturing trade/GDP was essentially unchanged until the fourth quarter of 2008, when
it dropped to nearly 10 percent below its value four quarters earlier. By the ￿rst and second
quarters of 2009, world trade/GDP was about 20 percent below its level four quarters earlier.
By the end of 2009, trade/GDP was at about the level of four-quarters before, as the black
line approaches 1.
What would have happened to this ratio with shocks only to demand? For each of the









the counterfactual change in trade/GDP. The solid red line plots this counterfactual. Note
that the demand shocks alone capture the magnitude of the decline in trade/GDP across
all the recent four-quarter windows, accounting for more than 80 percent of the decline in
global trade/GDP during the recession.
29While we plot the overlapping four-quarter changes as a continuous line, the changes are not cumulative.
We calculate each four-quarter change independently and plot each value on its own.
20When we perform this exercise allowing only for productivity shocks, trade friction shocks,
or de￿cit shocks, the implied changes in global trade/GDP are quite small, so that the lines
remain close to 1. Hence no other set of shocks, on their own, comes close to matching the
actual pattern of decline in global trade/GDP.
We now turn to the experience of individual countries. Heterogeneity in the Head-Ries
indices reported above suggests that trade friction shocks may have played a signi￿cant
role in reducing trade/GDP in some countries. In Figure 9, we plot the results of our
counterfactual exercise separately for the four largest economies. The United States and
Germany largely mirror the results for global trade, with demand shocks explaining most of
the changes in trade/GDP. For Japan, the actual declines in trade/GDP signi￿cantly exceed
the contribution from demand shocks alone in the depths of the recession. No single set
of shocks on their own account for a majority of these declines. In China, the decline in
trade/GDP started earlier and, like Japan, no single set of shocks explain it. For both Japan
and China, the trade friction shocks are arguably the largest contributors.
6.2 Focusing on 2008:Q1 to 2009:Q1
To get a better sense for the experiences across all countries, we now focus on 2008:Q1 to
2009:Q1, which captures the precipitous decline in trade in the Great Recession. Table 2
shows the combined impact on trade/GDP for each country for each of our counterfactual
exercises in which all shocks are set to 1 except for (in separate columns): (i) demand shocks,
(ii) trade friction shocks, (iii) productivity shocks, and (iv) the de￿cits.30
To quantify these results we introduce a measure of a counterfactual￿ s contribution to a
change over the period. Writing the actual change in trade/GDP for country i as b xi and
its counterfactual change, given a particular set of counterfactual shocks b s, as b xi(b s) we ￿rst
construct:
￿ (b s) =
I X
i
wi [b xi(b s) ￿ b xi]
2 ;
where the weights wi are country i￿ s share of world trade in 2008:Q1 (as shown in Table
1). An important feature of this measure is that it does not net out the mean value of
the deviation. We then express this deviation relative to the deviations in the data from
30The top row, in boldface and labeled ￿World,￿ shows the change in global trade to GDP plotted in
Figure 8 (the ￿09:Q1￿data points).
21a scenario of no change, ￿ (￿), where ￿ is a vector of 1￿ s. Thus, our ￿nal measure of the





This measure appears as the ￿share of trade-weighted variance explained￿in the last row of
Table 2 for each of the global counterfactuals.31 The demand shocks contribute the most to
explaining the decline in trade/GDP over 2008:Q1 to 2009:Q1.
Of the large contribution of demand shocks, the decline in demand for durables makes
a contribution of 64 percent. Figure 10 illustrates this result, along with several other
counterfactuals. For each counterfactual exercise b s, the x-axis in each panel in Figure 10
shows b xi while the y-axis shows b xi(b s).
Using only the b s backed out from the data, all points line up on the 45 degree, shown in the
lower-right quadrant. For this case, ￿ (b s) equals zero and V(b s) equals 1. The upper-left quad-
rant of Figure 10 shows what happens with only the actual changes in non-manufacturing
de￿cits. Countries remain far from the 45 degree line, indicating that shocks to de￿cits had
little to do with the decline in trade/GDP (contributing only 5 percent). The upper-right
quadrant shows the counterfactual involving only trade-friction shocks. They capture much
of the decline for some countries but only contribute 9 to 17 percent overall. The lower-left
quadrant shows the results with only the shocks to durable demand in the data. They ac-
count well for the overall pattern, contributing 64 percent, but do a poor job for a handful
of countries.
We have run counterfactuals involving many other combinations of shocks, reporting
results in Appendix Table 3. A general ￿nding is that no combination of shocks accounts for
a large fraction of the decline in trade/GDP unless it includes the actual shocks to durable
demand.
6.3 The Global Trading System as a Transmitter of the Recession
How much did shocks from individual countries a⁄ect other countries throughout the world?
As an example, consider the global impact of the negative shocks to demand for durable
31We provide a range for the contribution of trade frictions since it is sensitive to the inclusion of ROW for
which we have little in the way of direct measures. The higher number drops observation for ROW while the
lower value includes it. A particular b s can move trade/GDP in the opposite direction from what happened,
implying a negative value of V(b s).
22and non-durable manufactures just in the United States, with all other shocks set to 1. The
penultimate column of Table 2 shows simulated trade/GDP at the global and country level






. The impact of these shocks
on the world is large: They reduces global trade by about 3 percent relative to GDP. One
also sees the impact of geography. Mexico and Canada are a⁄ected very signi￿cantly, while
Germany, for example, is relatively insulated.
The last column of Table 2 shows an alternative exercise in which the only shocks are to
trade frictions involving China and Japan. Global trade also falls by about 3 percent relative
to GDP, but trade diversion leads to trade increases for some countries, such as South Korea.
More generally, we can ask how much the fate of each country, in terms of trade/GDP, its
relative GDP, and manufacturing/GDP, was the consequence of shocks at home versus those
transmitted to it through the trading system from other countries. Table 3 includes three
columns for each of the objects trade/GDP, GDP, and production. The ￿rst of the three
columns reports what actually happened to each of these magnitudes during the recession
for each of our countries i: The second column then reports what would have happened if the
only shocks in the system were shocks from other countries b s￿i (i.e., row i corresponds to a
counterfactual that eliminates all shocks containing an i subscript). Finally, the third column
reports the impact if the only shocks were those that directly hit each country, b si. For the
United States, for example, the decline in trade/GDP by a factor of 0.78 would have been a
modest 0.95 in the absence of direct shocks but what happened at home by itself would have
implied a larger drop by a factor of 0.85. Note that the United States actually experienced
an increase in its relative GDP during the period. This positive outcome was totally the
result of domestic shocks which more than o⁄set negative ones from abroad. Similarly, the
drop in manufacturing production (relative to global GDP) by a factor of 0.93 was totally
the consequence of foreign factors which more than o⁄set the e⁄ect of domestic shocks. The
country for which domestic factors had the greatest expansionary e⁄ect is China, where they
overwhelmed the negative e⁄ect of foreign factors on each of these magnitudes.32
32Note that domestic shocks tended to mitigate the e⁄ect of foreign shocks on relative GDP. The reason is
that the major shock hitting most countries was a shift away from spending on manufactures toward spending
on services. Since services are more intensive in domestic labor as opposed to foreign labor (through imported
intermediates), the e⁄ect on domestic GDP is generally positive.
237 The 2001 Recession and the Great Depression
We perform our counterfactuals for the period surrounding the last U.S. recession in 2001
(dropping a few of our 22 countries for which we lack data). Figure 11 shows that in the
four quarters leading up to 2001:Q1, global trade/GDP increased at an annual rate of about
5 percent, with this growth predominantly due to reduced trade frictions. The subsequent
decline in trade/GDP coinciding with the recession was much milder than in 2008, but was
similar in that it can be almost entirely explained by demand shocks, with the other three
types of shock contributing roughly zero. After the recession ended in mid-2002, trade/GDP
resumed its secular growth, again explained by declines in trade frictions.
Another major trade collapse occurred during the Great Depression. Observers such
as Irwin (1998) attribute this earlier collapse to increased trade frictions. We have su¢ -
cient Depression-era data to construct Head-Ries indices (1) for the bilateral trade between
the United States and eight partners: Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Appendix A describes our data. Figure 12 compares
a simple average of these Head-Ries indices from the Great Depression (seen in the solid
line and corresponding to the lower x-axis) with the equivalent simple average of Head-Ries
indices from the Great Recession (the dotted line which corresponds to the upper x-axis).
Because of data limitations, these indices are annual rather than quarterly, and pool durables
and non-durables.
Consistent with our results above, the average Head-Ries index for the recent recession
declines only slightly in 2008 and 2009 relative to 2007. In contrast, the solid line plunges
by nearly 50 percent in the years following 1930 and ￿nishes 1937 below its pre-depression
value. Data limitations prevent us from running our counterfactuals for the Depression,
but the large drops in the Head-Ries index suggest that we would attribute much more of
the decline in trade to increases in trade frictions in the Great Depression. An explanation
for the di⁄erence with the Great Recession is that the world trading system is now better
equipped to resist protectionist pressure.
248 Conclusion
A prominent characteristic of the recent global recession was a large and rapid drop in trade
relative to GDP. To delve into these dramatic changes in patterns of trade, production,
and GDP, we build an accounting framework relating them to shocks to the composition
of demand, trade frictions, de￿cits, and productivities across several sectors. Applying our
framework to the recent recession, we ￿nd that shocks to manufacturing demand, particularly
for durables, account for the bulk of the decline in trade/GDP. The trade declines in China
and Japan, however, re￿ ect a moderate contribution from increased trade frictions.
We developed this approach with the recent recession in mind. We anticipate, however,
that the framework can be applied quite generally to study the geography of global booms
and busts.
References
[1] Alessandria, George, Joseph Kaboski, and Virgiliu Midrigan. ￿Inventories, Lumpy
Trade, and Large Devaluations,￿American Economic Review, December 2010a, 100:1-38.
[2] Alessandria, George, Joseph Kaboski, and Virgiliu Midrigan. ￿The Great Trade Col-
lapse of 2008-09: An Inventory Adjustment?￿Working Paper, 2010b.
[3] Alvarez, Fernando and Robert E. Lucas. ￿General Equilibrium Analysis of the Eaton-
Kortum Model of International Trade,￿Journal of Monetary Economics, September 2007, 54:
1726-1768.
[4] Amiti, Mary and David Weinstein. ￿Exports and Financial Shocks,￿ Working Paper,
2010.
[5] Anderson, James E. and Eric van Wincoop. ￿Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the
Border Puzzle,￿American Economic Review, March 2003, 93: 170-192.
[6] Anderson, James E. and Yoto Yotov. ￿The Changing Incidence of Geography,￿Working
Paper, 2009.
[7] Arkolakis, Costas, Arnaud Costinot, and Andres Rodriguez-Clare. ￿New Trade Mod-
els, Same Old Gains?￿Working Paper, 2009.
[8] Baldwin, Richard. The Collapse of Global Trade, Murky Protectionism, and the Crisis:
Recommendations for the G20, Vox EU Ebook, 2009.
[9] Behrens, Kristian, Gregory Corcos, and Giordano Mion. ￿Trade Crisis? What Trade
Crisis?￿Working Paper, 2010.
[10] Bems, Rudolphs, Johnson, Robert, and Kei-Mu Yi. ￿The Role of Vertical Linkages in
the Propagation of the Global Downturn of 2008,￿Working Paper, 2010.
[11] Bhagwati, Jagdish. Comments in ￿Collapse in World Trade: A Symposium of Views,￿The
International Economy, Spring 2009.
25[12] Bricongne, Jean-Charles, Lionel FontagnØ, Guillaume Gaulier, Daria Taglione, and
Vincent Vicard. ￿Firms and the Global Crisis: French Exporters in the Turmoil,￿Working
Paper, 2010.
[13] Brock, William. Comments in ￿Collapse in World Trade: A Symposium of Views,￿ The
International Economy, Spring 2009.
[14] Caliendo, Lorenzo and Fernando Parro. ￿Estimates of the Trade and Welfare E⁄ects of
NAFTA,￿Working Paper, 2009.
[15] Chaney, Thomas. ￿Distorted Gravity: Heterogeneous Firms, Market Structure, and the
Geography of International Trade,￿American Economic Review, September 2008, 98: 1707-
1721.
[16] Chari, V.V., Patrick Kehoe, and Ellen McGrattan. ￿Business Cycle Accounting,￿
Econometrica, May 2007, 75, pp. 781-836.
[17] Dekle, Robert, Jonathan Eaton, and Samuel Kortum. ￿Global Rebalancing with Grav-
ity: Measuring the Burden of Adjustment,￿IMF Sta⁄ Papers, 2008, Vol. 55, No 3:511-540.
[18] Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum. ￿Technology, Geography, and Trade,￿Economet-
rica, September 2002, 70, pp. 1741-1780.
[19] Eichengreen, Barry. Comments in ￿Collapse in World Trade: A Symposium of Views,￿The
International Economy, Spring 2009.
[20] Engel, Charles and Jian Wang. ￿International Trade in Durable Goods: Understanding
Volatility, Cyclicality, and Elasticities,￿Working Paper, 2009.
[21] Head, Keith and John Ries. ￿Increasing Returns versus National Product Di⁄erentia-
tion as an Explanation for the Pattern of U.S.-Canada Trade,￿American Economic Review,
September 2001, 91: 858-876.
[22] Irwin, Douglas A.. ￿The Smoot-Hawley Tari⁄: A Quantitative Assessment,￿Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, May 1998, 80: pp326-334.
[23] Jacks, Meissner, and Novy. ￿Trade Booms, Trade Busts, and Trade Costs,￿ Working
Paper, 2009.
[24] Johnson, Robert and Guillermo Noguera. ￿Accounting for Intermediates: Production
Sharing and Trade in Value Added,￿Working Paper, 2009.
[25] Levchenko, Andrei, Logan Lewis, and Linda Tesar. ￿The Collapse of International
Trade During the 2008-2009 Crisis: In Search of the Smoking Gun,￿Working Paper, 2010.
[26] McKinnon, Ronald. Comments in ￿Collapse in World Trade: A Symposium of Views,￿The
International Economy, Spring 2009.
[27] Melitz, Marc. ￿The Impact of Trade on Aggregate Industry Productivity and Intra-Industry
Reallocations,￿Econometrica November 2003.
[28] Redding, Stephen and Anthony Venables. ￿Economic Geography and International In-
equality,￿Journal of International Economics, January 2004, 62, pp. 53-82.
[29] Yi, Kei-Mu. ￿The Collapse of Global Trade: The Role of Vertical Specialization.￿In The
Collapse of Global Trade, Murky Protectionism, and the Crisis: Recommendations for the G20,
edited by Richard Baldwin and Simon Evenett, 2009.
26Tables
Country Share of Global GDP Share of Global Trade Trade / GDP
(percent) (percent) (percent)
Austria 0.7 1.6 40.7
Canada 2.6 2.9 20.0
China 6.6 9.6 26.6
Czech Republic 0.4 1.3 64.5
Denmark 0.6 0.9 28.2
Finland 0.5 0.8 30.4
France 4.9 5.3 19.8
Germany 6.3 11.0 32.1
Greece 0.6 0.4 12.2
Hungary 0.3 0.9 65.5
India 2.2 1.2 10.3
Italy 3.9 4.3 19.9
Japan 8.2 5.4 12.1
Mexico 1.9 2.3 22.3
Poland 0.9 1.6 32.0
Romania 0.3 0.5 28.8
Slovakia 0.1 0.6 73.6
South Korea 1.8 3.0 30.7
Spain 2.7 2.7 18.4
Sweden 0.8 1.5 32.1
United Kingdom 4.8 4.3 16.5
United States 23.9 11.9 9.1
ROW 25.1 26.0 18.9
Table 1: Summary Statistics (2008:Q1) for Countries in Dataset
Notes: Quarterly GDP for ROW calculated by assuming constant quarterly growth between annual
￿gures from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database. Exports and imports for ROW taken by


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39Figure 11: Global Trade/GDP in Data and Counterfactuals for the 2001 Recession
Notes: Growth in all variables is expressed relative to global GDP. Each point on the
x-axis corresponds to growth over the 4-quarters preceding that period. The plot is
therefore a series of 4-quarter static counterfactuals, connected together.
Figure 12: Head-Ries Indices: Great Recession vs. Great Depression
Notes: We plot the simple average of normalized bilateral Head-Ries indices for the
United States and Austria, Canada, Germany, Spain, Finland, the United Kingdom,
Japan, and Sweden. Unlike the other Head-Ries indices, these are done using annual data
on all of manufacturing. See Appendix A for details on the construction of the dataset.
40Appendices
Appendix A: Data Sources and Related Procedures
In this appendix, we ￿rst detail our sources for trade, production, input-output, and macro-
economic data. We omit countries lacking adequate data and retain 22 countries in our
dataset. We next describe the construction of sectoral industrial production and producer
price indices and the temporal disaggregation procedure that uses these indices along with
annual data to generate monthly production values for each manufacturing sector. Finally,
we list the data sources and procedures used to calculate the Head-Ries indices for Great
Depression-era data.
Trade Data
We use monthly bilateral trade data from the Global Trade Atlas Database. These data are
not seasonally adjusted and are in dollars. We aggregate 2-digit harmonized system (HS)
categories to generate bilateral and multilateral trade ￿ ows in each manufacturing sector.
We calculate global trade/GDP, referred to in the introduction, by multiplying the world
trade volume index by the world trade price index available from the Netherlands Bureau
for Economic Policy Analysis and then dividing by our own estimations of world GDP.
Concordances Linking Trade and Production
A concordance was constructed to link the 2-digit HS trade data to the International Stan-
dard Industrial Classi￿cation (ISIC) codes used in the production data. We start by down-
loading the mapping of 6-digit HS codes to ISIC codes from the World Bank￿ s World In-
tegrated Trade Solution (WITS) website. This concordance was then merged with COM-
TRADE data on the volume of world trade at the 6-digit level for 2007-2008. We estimate
the proportion of each HS 2-digit code that belongs in each ISIC category using these detailed
worldwide trade weights. Then we can use the same concordance in the last step to map
production and trade to our sectors j 2 ￿M. Appendix Table 2 shows levels of exports/GDP
and imports/GDP, separately for each sector and country, for 2008:Q1 and 2009:Q1.
41Input-Output Coe¢ cients




i ￿from the 2009 edition of the OECD￿ s
country tables.33 We use the most recent input-output table available for each country. We
concord the 48 sectors used in these tables to form input-output tables for the three sectors
j 2 ￿. Appendix Table 1 shows how we classi￿ed these 48 sectors into durables, non-
durables, and non-manufactures. To determine ￿
j
i, we divide the total value added in sector
j of country i by that sector￿ s total output. To determine the values for ￿
jl
i , we divide total
spending in country i by sector j on inputs from sector l and divide this by that sector￿ s
total intermediate use at basic prices (i.e. net of taxes on products).
Additional Macro Data
Exchange rates to translate local currency values into dollars are from the OECD.Stat data-
base and from the IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics database. Other standard data
used in the paper, such as quarterly GDP and trade de￿cits, are from the Economist Intel-
ligence Unit (EIU). Trade and production data are translated using exchange rates at the
monthly frequency.
IP and PPI Indices by Sector
We need sectoral IP and PPI indices to generate monthly production levels for durables and
non-durables. The exact methodology used to construct the series depended on what series
were available on Datastream, as this was not consistent across countries. Three di⁄erent
methodologies were used.
For some countries, Datastream contains IP or PPI series on durable manufacturing and
non-durable manufacturing. Included in this category for IP are Canada, China, and the
United States. Included in this category for PPI are China and the United States. For China
the series are actually ￿Heavy Industry￿and ￿Light Industry.￿The key di⁄erence appears
to be that one group of non-durable manufactures, chemicals, is included in heavy industry.
Next, there are several countries for which Datastream contains IP or PPI series for cap-
ital goods, durable consumer goods, non-durable consumer goods, and intermediate goods.
We classify capital goods as durable, but need to be able to decompose the intermediate
goods into durable goods (such as metals) and non-durable goods (such as paper). The
presence of more detailed manufacturing industry data allows us to do this using regression
33The only exception is China￿ s input-output table, which was obtained from Robert Feenstra.
42analysis. We regress monthly log-changes in intermediate goods IP or PPI series on log
changes for underlying manufacturing industry series to reveal the composition of the inter-
mediate series and exclude countries for which there is not a good ￿t. The regression results
give us estimates of the industry composition of intermediate goods manufacturing, and we
combine this with our industry concordances to generate durable and non-durable interme-
diate goods IP or PPI series. We then combine all the more aggregated categories, using
their weights in production from the annual data, to generate indices for overall durables
and non-durables. This methodology applies to the construction of our IP and PPI series
for Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
There are some countries with IP or PPI data for multiple manufacturing industries
together with aggregate manufacturing (or occasionally, total industry IP or PPI). We use
similar regression analysis to ascertain the industry composition of the broad measure, and
then use our data on the durable and non-durable composition of each of these industries to
construct aggregate durable and non-durable series. When the regression analysis does not
yield a good ￿t (judged by a high R-squared and coe¢ cients that sum close to 1), we do not
include that country. This procedure was used for India, Japan, Mexico and Poland.
We also require IP and PPI indices for overall manufacturing. These monthly data for
China were found at chinadataonline.com, and for the other countries were downloaded from
the OECD Main Economic Indicators Database (MEI) and the EIU Database. Finally, we
estimate changes in the PPI indices for our ROW category (^ p
j
ROW) as an average of the ^ p
j
i
across the 22 countries in our sample.
Annual Production by Sector
In addition to monthly IP and PPI indices, we need annual production levels for each sector
and for overall manufacturing. These annual data are taken from the OECD Structural
Analysis Database (STAN) and the United Nations National Accounts and Industrial Sta-
tistics Database (UNIDO). For China, Chang-Tai Hsieh provided us with cross-tabs from
4-digit manufacturing production data from the census of manufacturing production. We
used these data to determine the durables/non-durables split and multiplied these shares by
the manufacturing total from http://chinadataonline.org.
We concord International Standard Industrial Classi￿cation (ISIC Rev. 3) 2-digit man-
ufacturing production data to the appropriate sector de￿nition (whatever is required to
43match the IP/PPI indices) to get annual totals for each of these categories.34 Our de￿ni-
tion of manufacturing consists of ISIC industries 15 through 36, excluding 23 (petroleum).
We further divide goods into capital goods, durable consumer goods, non-durable consumer
goods, durable intermediate goods, and non-durable intermediate goods using the U.S. im-
port end use classi￿cation. Harmonized System (HS) trade data are simultaneously mapped
into the end use classi￿cation using a concordance from the U.S. Census Bureau and into
the ISIC classi￿cation using the concordances from the WITS website. World trade volumes
at the 6-digit level for 2007-2008 are again used to estimate what proportion of each ISIC
classi￿cation belongs in each of the categories.
Temporal Disaggregation
Monthly manufacturing production level data are not available for most countries we study.
However, annual data are available for all of these countries. We use monthly IP and PPI
indices to disaggregate annual production levels into internally consistent monthly produc-
tion values and out-of-sample predictions re￿ ecting all available monthly information. This
problem, referred to as temporal disaggregation, was studied from the 1950￿ s by, among
others, Milton Friedman (see Friedman, 1962).
We disaggregate and extrapolate annual production data in country i and sector j into
monthly data using an adaptation of the Chow-Lin procedure (Chow and Lin, 1971). The
￿rst step of the procedure requires an elasticity between the monthly production data and
the corresponding IP and PPI indices. Our baseline procedure assumes that both of these
elasticities equals one, and as a robustness check, we also estimate these elasticities from a
regression of annual production levels on the appropriately accumulated sum of the monthly
indicators. The next step uses the assumed or estimated elasticity to generate predicted
monthly values for the level of production. Generally, there will be a gap between the
actual annual production level and the sum of the 12 predicted monthly values. The Chow-
Lin procedure apportions this gap equally to each monthly predicted value. This creates
an internally consistent monthly series that sums to the actual annual data, but generally
creates arti￿cial jumps from December to January due to residual corrections being identical
within years and di⁄erent across years. Hence, we instead follow Fernandez (1981) and
redistribute the gap in a way that allows for serial correlation in the monthly residuals and
34Occasionally, a 2-digit sector will be dropped for one year, so we impute an alternative series where
production levels are "grown" backward from the more recent and most complete data, only using the
growth rates from categories reported in both years.
44eliminates these spurious jumps. We also follow Di Fonzi (2002) in treating the relationship
between annual production levels and monthly IP and PPI indices as a log-linear rather
than linear relationship. Exact details of our procedures are available from the authors on
request.35
We run this procedure for the two manufacturing sectors separately, as well as for total
manufacturing, which has the highest quality production data. Hence, we multiply the sector
shares of manufacturing implied in our estimates by the overall manufacturing number. In
the end, we have monthly series for durable and non-durable manufacturing production which
are consistent with published annual (and implied monthly) levels of total manufacturing
production in each country.
As a quality check, we compare our monthly ￿tted series to actual monthly U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau data for the values of durable and non-durable manufacturing shipments (the
United States is among the few countries with such monthly data). The U.S. monthly data
are collected in the M3 manufacturing survey. For this quality test only, we re-run both
procedures using annual totals from the M3 survey. Though M3 data are available through
2009, we only use data for 1995-2007 ￿the same amount of data we have for most other
countries. Appendix Figure A2 shows that both procedures do an excellent job of matching
movements in the non-durables series, including the out-of-sample decline in production dur-
ing the Great Recession. Our baseline ￿Beta equals 1￿procedure also does an excellent job
for durables, though our procedure with estimated elasticities understates to some degree
the decline in durables production during the Great Recession. We therefore use the baseline
procedure for all results in the text. We checked all results using the estimated coe¢ cients.
Both procedures yield similar global results.
Calculating Head-Ries Indices During the Great Depression
We obtained data on bilateral and multilateral manufacturing trade as well as exchange
rates for 1926-1937 from the annual Foreign Commerce Yearbooks, published by the U.S.
Department of Commerce. Total U.S. multilateral manufacturing imports and exports were
taken from Carter et al. (2006). The gross value of manufacturing, required for the denom-
inator of (1), were obtained from a variety of country-speci￿c sources.36 The U.S. ratio of
35The procedure was adapted from the code in Quilis, Enrique. ￿A Matlab Library of Temporal Disag-
gregation and Interpolation Methods: Summary,￿2006.
36Where needed, U.S. Department of Commerce (1968) was used to translate currency or physical units into
U.S. dollars. Austria: Bundesamt fur Statistik (1927-1936) was used to obtain product-speci￿c production
data, either in hundreds of Austrian schilling or in kilograms. Canada: Value of manufacturing data were
45gross output to value added in manufacturing, found in Carter (2006), was applied to foreign
manufacturing value added when output data were unavailable.
The bilateral trade and the manufacturing totals often re￿ ect changing availability of
data for disaggregated categories. For example, one year￿ s total growth may re￿ ect both
20% growth in Paper Products as well as the initial measurement (relative to previous
missing values) of Transportation Equipment. Since inspection suggests that such missing
values do not simply re￿ ect zero values, we calculate year-to-year growth rates using only
the common set of recorded goods. For manufacturing production, we not only need the
growth rate, but the level also matters because we subtract the level of exports to measure
absorption. We apply the growth rate backwards from the most complete, typically also the
most recent, series value.
Appendix B: Trade Frictions and Productivity
Her we show how the productivity and trade friction shocks can be combined into a single


























































































































available in U.S. dollars from Urquhart (1983). Germany: Data were obtained from Statistishen Reichsamt
(1931, 1935, 1940). Finland, Japan, Spain, and Sweden: Value added in manufacturing, in local currency
units, were taken from Smits (2009). Peru: Output data in Peruvian pounds and soles obtained from
Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio (1939). United Kingdom: Data were obtained from United Kingdom
Board of Trade (1938). These annual numbers combined less frequent results from the censuses in 1924,
1930, and 1935, with industrial production data, taken yearly, from 1927-1937.






























































































Notice that each individual shock as well as the combined shock all require price data.
We￿ ll now try to derive an alternative to the combined shock that serves the same purpose
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Thus, the implication for trade shares given wages is the same as in the original parameter-
47ization.
First, we want to show that substituting (26) and (27) into (24) and (12) yields (28) and


































































































































































































































which follows from the de￿nition of ￿i.
Next, we want to show that ￿
j










































































































































































































































































Note that we can infer b ￿ from input-output coe¢ cients and data on changes in trade shares
and GDP without any price data. Hence there is an alternative decomposition into the same
b ￿￿ s and b D￿ s as above and b ￿ ￿ s not requiring price data. The contributions of the ￿rst two
would be the same in our analysis above.
Appendix C: Solving for the Equilibrium
In this appendix, we explain in more detail how we solve for the system￿ s equilibrium. Given
a vector of wage changes b w, we solve (18) and (19) jointly for changes in trade shares and





















































































49and the 2 by 2 matrix e ￿i contains
e ￿
jl
i (1 ￿ e ￿
j
i)
in its j￿ th row and l￿ th column for all j;l 2 ￿M.


















Following Caliendo and Parro (2009), we can substitute this expression into the right hand






￿ s by stacking (D1)
across all countries:
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0 (b w) has ￿
j
ni(b w) in its n￿ th row and i￿ th column. We can denote the solution by
X(b w) =
h











where the elements of X(b w) are X
j







50Finally, summing up (32) over j 2 ￿M yields
X
D
i (b w) + X
N
























n (b w): (D2)
This non-linear system of equations can be solved for the I ￿ 1 changes in wages.
Appendix References
[1] Bundesamt fur Statistik. Statistisches Handbuch fur die Republik Osterreich.
Vienna: Bundesamtes fur Statistik, 1927-1936.
[2] Carter, Susan B., Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L.
Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright. Historical Statistics of the United States:
Millenial Edition, Vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[3] Chow, Gregory. and A. Lin. ￿Best Linear Unbiased Interpolation, Distribution
and Extrapolation of Time Series by Related Series,￿Review of Economics and Statistics,
1971.
[4] Di Fonzo, Tommaso. ￿Temporal Disaggregation of Economic Time Series: Towards
a Dynamic Extension,￿Working Paper, 2002.
[5] Fernandez, Roque. ￿A Methodological Note on the Estimation of Time Series,￿
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1981, Vol. 63, No. 3, pp471-476.
[6] Friedman, Milton. ￿The Interpolation of Time Series by Related Series,￿Journal
of the American Statistical Association, 1962, 57: pp729-757.
[7] Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio. Extracto Estadistico del Peru 1939. Im-
prenta Americana: Lima, Peru. 1939.
[8] Urquhart, M.C. (ed.). Historical Statistics of Canada. Ottawa, Canada: Statistics
Canada, 1983.
[9] Smits, J.P, P.J. Woltjer, and D. Ma. ￿A Dataset on Comparative Histori-
cal National Accounts, ca. 1970-1950: A Time-Series Perspective,￿Groningen Growth and
51Development Centre Research Memorandum GD-107, Groningen: University of Groningen.
2009.
[10] Statistischen Reichsamt. Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich. Berlin:
Reimer Hobbing, 1931, 1935, 1940.
[11] U.K. Board of Trade. Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom: 1924:1938.
London: Statistical Department, Board of Trade, 1938.
[12] U.S. Department of Commerce. Foreign Commerce Yearbook, Vols. 1928-1938.
New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.
52A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
T
a
b
l
e
s
(
1
)
W
o
o
d
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
w
o
o
d
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
r
k
(
1
)
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
,
 
h
u
n
t
i
n
g
,
 
f
o
r
e
s
t
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
s
h
i
n
g
(
2
)
O
t
h
e
r
 
n
o
n
-
m
e
t
a
l
l
i
c
 
m
i
n
e
r
a
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
(
2
)
M
i
n
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
q
u
a
r
r
y
i
n
g
 
(
e
n
e
r
g
y
)
(
3
)
I
r
o
n
 
&
 
s
t
e
e
l
(
3
)
M
i
n
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
q
u
a
r
r
y
i
n
g
 
(
n
o
n
-
e
n
e
r
g
y
)
(
4
)
N
o
n
-
f
e
r
r
o
u
s
 
m
e
t
a
l
s
(
4
)
C
o
k
e
,
 
r
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
p
e
t
r
o
l
e
u
m
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
n
u
c
l
e
a
r
 
f
u
e
l
(
5
)
F
a
b
r
i
c
a
t
e
d
 
m
e
t
a
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
,
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
 
m
a
c
h
i
n
e
r
y
 
&
 
e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
(
5
)
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
,
 
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
e
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
i
t
y
(
6
)
M
a
c
h
i
n
e
r
y
 
&
 
e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
,
 
n
e
c
(
6
)
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
g
a
s
;
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
g
a
s
e
o
u
s
 
f
u
e
l
s
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
m
a
i
n
s
(
7
)
O
f
f
i
c
e
,
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
 
&
 
c
o
m
p
u
t
i
n
g
 
m
a
c
h
i
n
e
r
y
(
7
)
S
t
e
a
m
 
a
n
d
 
h
o
t
 
w
a
t
e
r
 
s
u
p
p
l
y
(
8
)
E
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
a
l
 
m
a
c
h
i
n
e
r
y
 
&
 
a
p
p
a
r
a
t
u
s
,
 
n
e
c
(
8
)
C
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
,
 
p
u
r
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
w
a
t
e
r
(
9
)
R
a
d
i
o
,
 
t
e
l
e
v
i
s
i
o
n
 
&
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
(
9
)
C
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
(
1
0
)
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
,
 
p
r
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
 
&
 
o
p
t
i
c
a
l
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
(
1
0
)
W
h
o
l
e
s
a
l
e
 
&
 
r
e
t
a
i
l
 
t
r
a
d
e
;
 
r
e
p
a
i
r
s
(
1
1
)
M
o
t
o
r
 
v
e
h
i
c
l
e
s
,
 
t
r
a
i
l
e
r
s
 
&
 
s
e
m
i
-
t
r
a
i
l
e
r
s
(
1
1
)
H
o
t
e
l
s
 
&
 
r
e
s
t
a
u
r
a
n
t
s
(
1
2
)
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
 
&
 
r
e
p
a
i
r
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
s
h
i
p
s
 
&
 
b
o
a
t
s
(
1
2
)
L
a
n
d
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
;
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
 
v
i
a
 
p
i
p
e
l
i
n
e
s
(
1
3
)
A
i
r
c
r
a
f
t
 
&
 
s
p
a
c
e
c
r
a
f
t
(
1
3
)
W
a
t
e
r
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
(
1
4
)
R
a
i
l
r
o
a
d
 
e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
 
&
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
 
e
q
u
i
p
 
n
.
e
.
c
.
(
1
4
)
A
i
r
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
(
1
5
)
5
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
:
 
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
n
e
c
;
 
r
e
c
y
c
l
i
n
g
 
(
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
F
u
r
n
i
t
u
r
e
)
(
1
5
)
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
a
u
x
i
l
i
a
r
y
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
;
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
r
a
v
e
l
 
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
(
1
6
)
P
o
s
t
 
&
 
t
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
1
7
)
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
&
 
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
(
1
8
)
R
e
a
l
 
e
s
t
a
t
e
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
(
1
)
F
o
o
d
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
,
 
b
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
o
b
a
c
c
o
(
1
9
)
R
e
n
t
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
m
a
c
h
i
n
e
r
y
 
&
 
e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
(
2
)
T
e
x
t
i
l
e
s
,
 
t
e
x
t
i
l
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
,
 
l
e
a
t
h
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
o
t
w
e
a
r
(
2
0
)
C
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
 
&
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
(
3
)
P
u
l
p
,
 
p
a
p
e
r
,
 
p
a
p
e
r
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
,
 
p
r
i
n
t
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
p
u
b
l
i
s
h
i
n
g
(
2
1
)
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
&
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
(
4
)
C
h
e
m
i
c
a
l
s
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
p
h
a
r
m
a
c
e
u
t
i
c
a
l
s
(
2
2
)
O
t
h
e
r
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
A
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
(
5
)
P
h
a
r
m
a
c
e
u
t
i
c
a
l
s
(
2
3
)
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
a
d
m
i
n
.
 
&
 
d
e
f
e
n
c
e
;
 
c
o
m
p
u
l
s
o
r
y
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
(
6
)
R
u
b
b
e
r
 
&
 
p
l
a
s
t
i
c
s
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
(
2
4
)
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
(
7
)
5
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
:
 
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
n
e
c
;
 
r
e
c
y
c
l
i
n
g
 
(
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
F
u
r
n
i
t
u
r
e
)
(
2
5
)
H
e
a
l
t
h
 
&
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
w
o
r
k
(
2
6
)
O
t
h
e
r
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
,
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
&
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
a
l
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
(
2
7
)
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
 
&
 
e
x
t
r
a
-
t
e
r
r
i
t
o
r
i
a
l
o
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
&
 
b
o
d
i
e
s
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
 
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
N
o
n
-
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
N
o
n
-
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
 
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
T
a
b
l
e
1
:
S
e
c
t
o
r
d
e
￿
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
t
h
e
O
E
C
D
I
n
p
u
t
-
O
u
t
p
u
t
t
a
b
l
e
s
N
o
t
e
s
:
A
u
t
h
o
r
s
￿
c
l
a
s
s
i
￿
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
t
h
e
4
8
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
O
E
C
D
i
n
p
u
t
-
o
u
t
p
u
t
t
a
b
l
e
s
,
w
i
t
h
o
n
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
(
￿
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
n
e
c
;
r
e
c
y
c
l
i
n
g
(
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
F
u
r
n
i
t
u
r
e
)
￿
)
s
p
l
i
t
e
v
e
n
l
y
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
d
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
a
n
d
n
o
n
-
d
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
.
53A
l
l
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
N
o
n
-
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
A
l
l
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
N
o
n
-
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
A
l
l
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
N
o
n
-
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
A
l
l
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
N
o
n
-
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
W
o
r
l
d
1
8
.
2
1
2
.
7
5
.
5
1
8
.
2
1
2
.
7
5
.
5
0
.
8
1
0
.
7
8
0
.
8
9
0
.
8
1
0
.
7
8
0
.
8
9
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
4
3
.
0
3
1
.
0
1
2
.
0
3
8
.
4
2
6
.
3
1
2
.
1
0
.
7
8
0
.
7
3
0
.
8
9
0
.
8
4
0
.
8
0
0
.
9
2
C
a
n
a
d
a
1
8
.
5
1
3
.
0
5
.
5
2
1
.
6
1
5
.
6
5
.
9
0
.
8
9
0
.
8
3
1
.
0
3
0
.
9
9
0
.
9
3
1
.
1
4
C
h
i
n
a
3
3
.
8
2
4
.
5
9
.
3
1
9
.
5
1
4
.
5
5
.
0
0
.
7
4
0
.
7
2
0
.
7
9
0
.
6
7
0
.
6
7
0
.
6
8
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
6
8
.
1
5
4
.
9
1
3
.
2
6
0
.
9
4
4
.
4
1
6
.
5
0
.
8
0
0
.
7
9
0
.
8
7
0
.
8
0
0
.
7
6
0
.
9
0
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
2
8
.
4
1
5
.
2
1
3
.
2
2
8
.
1
1
7
.
5
1
0
.
6
0
.
9
0
0
.
8
4
0
.
9
7
0
.
8
9
0
.
8
6
0
.
9
4
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
3
4
.
2
2
4
.
4
9
.
8
2
6
.
7
1
9
.
4
7
.
3
0
.
7
2
0
.
6
9
0
.
7
9
0
.
7
7
0
.
7
2
0
.
9
1
F
r
a
n
c
e
1
9
.
6
1
2
.
1
7
.
5
1
9
.
9
1
2
.
7
7
.
2
0
.
8
3
0
.
7
9
0
.
8
9
0
.
8
8
0
.
8
5
0
.
9
4
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
3
8
.
1
2
7
.
5
1
0
.
6
2
6
.
1
1
7
.
4
8
.
6
0
.
8
5
0
.
8
1
0
.
9
5
0
.
9
2
0
.
8
9
0
.
9
9
G
r
e
e
c
e
5
.
6
2
.
6
3
.
0
1
8
.
8
1
0
.
7
8
.
1
0
.
8
4
0
.
7
5
0
.
9
1
0
.
9
1
0
.
8
8
0
.
9
4
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
6
8
.
4
5
4
.
3
1
4
.
1
6
2
.
6
4
7
.
2
1
5
.
4
0
.
8
6
0
.
8
3
0
.
9
9
0
.
8
4
0
.
8
0
0
.
9
6
I
n
d
i
a
9
.
2
4
.
7
4
.
5
1
1
.
3
8
.
1
3
.
2
1
.
0
2
1
.
1
3
0
.
9
0
1
.
0
5
1
.
0
5
1
.
0
4
I
t
a
l
y
2
1
.
8
1
4
.
4
7
.
4
1
8
.
1
1
1
.
2
6
.
9
0
.
8
1
0
.
7
8
0
.
8
8
0
.
8
2
0
.
7
6
0
.
9
3
J
a
p
a
n
1
5
.
5
1
3
.
3
2
.
2
8
.
6
5
.
5
3
.
1
0
.
5
7
0
.
5
6
0
.
6
6
0
.
7
6
0
.
6
8
0
.
9
1
M
e
x
i
c
o
2
0
.
9
1
7
.
7
3
.
2
2
3
.
7
1
7
.
1
6
.
6
1
.
0
5
1
.
0
3
1
.
1
9
1
.
0
2
1
.
0
1
1
.
0
3
P
o
l
a
n
d
3
0
.
7
2
2
.
0
8
.
7
3
3
.
4
2
2
.
3
1
1
.
0
0
.
9
3
0
.
9
0
1
.
0
0
0
.
8
7
0
.
8
2
0
.
9
6
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
2
1
.
2
1
4
.
5
6
.
7
3
6
.
4
2
4
.
5
1
1
.
9
0
.
9
2
0
.
9
3
0
.
9
0
0
.
7
8
0
.
6
7
0
.
9
9
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
7
5
.
6
6
1
.
3
1
4
.
3
7
1
.
6
5
3
.
2
1
8
.
4
0
.
7
5
0
.
7
4
0
.
8
0
0
.
7
7
0
.
7
2
0
.
9
1
S
o
u
t
h
 
K
o
r
e
a
3
5
.
8
2
9
.
2
6
.
6
2
5
.
7
1
8
.
9
6
.
9
1
.
1
5
1
.
1
6
1
.
1
1
1
.
0
3
1
.
0
2
1
.
0
5
S
p
a
i
n
1
5
.
5
9
.
7
5
.
7
2
1
.
3
1
3
.
7
7
.
6
0
.
7
6
0
.
7
0
0
.
8
6
0
.
7
0
0
.
6
3
0
.
8
3
S
w
e
d
e
n
3
5
.
1
2
5
.
2
9
.
8
2
9
.
1
2
0
.
3
8
.
8
0
.
8
6
0
.
7
9
1
.
0
4
0
.
8
9
0
.
8
2
1
.
0
5
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
1
4
.
0
9
.
2
4
.
8
1
9
.
0
1
2
.
5
6
.
6
0
.
9
8
0
.
9
0
1
.
1
4
0
.
9
8
0
.
9
0
1
.
1
4
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
7
.
5
5
.
4
2
.
1
1
0
.
7
7
.
6
3
.
0
0
.
8
1
0
.
7
9
0
.
8
4
0
.
7
7
0
.
7
3
0
.
8
7
R
O
W
1
6
.
4
1
0
.
2
6
.
2
2
1
.
4
1
5
.
5
5
.
9
0
.
8
8
0
.
8
2
0
.
9
8
0
.
8
5
0
.
8
3
0
.
9
2
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
 
/
 
G
D
P
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
2
0
0
9
:
Q
1
/
2
0
0
8
:
Q
1
)
 
i
n
:
2
0
0
8
:
Q
1
 
V
a
l
u
e
s
 
o
f
:
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
/
 
G
D
P
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
 
/
 
G
D
P
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
/
 
G
D
P
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
T
a
b
l
e
2
:
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
i
n
S
e
c
t
o
r
a
l
a
n
d
T
o
t
a
l
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
/
G
D
P
a
n
d
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
/
G
D
P
f
r
o
m
2
0
0
8
:
Q
1
t
o
2
0
0
9
:
Q
1
N
o
t
e
s
:
G
r
o
w
t
h
i
n
a
l
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
i
s
e
x
p
r
e
s
s
e
d
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
g
l
o
b
a
l
G
D
P
.
￿
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
￿
a
n
d
￿
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
￿
r
e
f
e
r
o
n
l
y
t
o
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
t
r
a
d
e
(
o
m
i
t
t
i
n
g
,
f
o
r
e
x
a
m
p
l
e
,
o
i
l
)
.
G
r
o
s
s
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
s
o
n
r
i
g
h
t
s
i
d
e
o
f
c
h
a
r
t
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
t
h
e
r
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
2
0
0
9
:
Q
1
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
t
o
2
0
0
8
:
Q
1
.
54S
h
o
c
k
:
S
e
c
t
o
r
:
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
N
o
n
-
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
N
o
n
-
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
N
o
n
-
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
N
o
n
-
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
(
2
0
0
8
:
Q
1
 
t
o
 
2
0
0
9
:
Q
1
)
0
.
6
4
0
.
1
7
0
.
0
7
 
t
o
 
0
.
1
3
0
.
0
8
 
t
o
 
0
.
1
2
0
.
0
5
-
0
.
0
1
0
.
1
1
0
.
0
1
0
.
6
5
0
.
0
9
 
t
o
 
0
.
1
7
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
2
0
.
7
1
0
.
7
4
0
.
1
8
 
t
o
 
0
.
2
6
1
.
0
0
D
e
m
a
n
d
 
S
h
o
c
k
s
T
r
a
d
e
 
F
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
D
e
f
i
c
i
t
 
S
h
o
c
k
s
P
r
o
d
.
 
S
h
o
c
k
s
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
T
r
a
d
e
-
W
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
 
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
E
x
p
l
a
i
n
e
d
(
"
X
"
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
S
h
o
c
k
s
 
a
r
e
 
I
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
)
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
T
a
b
l
e
3
:
C
r
o
s
s
-
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
E
x
p
l
a
n
a
t
o
r
y
P
o
w
e
r
o
f
C
o
m
b
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
S
h
o
c
k
s
,
2
0
0
8
:
Q
1
t
o
2
0
0
9
:
Q
1
N
o
t
e
s
:
R
a
n
g
e
s
f
o
r
s
h
a
r
e
o
f
v
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
e
d
r
e
￿
e
c
t
d
i
⁄
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
o
f
R
O
W
,
a
s
d
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
t
e
x
t
.
T
h
e
s
e
r
a
n
g
e
s
a
r
e
o
n
l
y
g
i
v
e
n
f
o
r
c
o
u
n
t
e
r
f
a
c
t
u
a
l
s
i
n
v
o
l
v
i
n
g
t
r
a
d
e
f
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
h
o
c
k
s
,
s
i
n
c
e
t
h
e
s
e
a
r
e
t
h
e
o
n
l
y
s
h
o
c
k
s
t
h
a
t
d
i
r
e
c
t
l
y
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
b
o
t
h
R
O
W
a
n
d
o
t
h
e
r
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
i
n
t
h
e
d
a
t
a
.
T
h
o
s
e
c
o
u
n
t
e
r
f
a
c
t
u
a
l
s
a
r
e
m
o
s
t
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
t
o
a
s
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
s
u
s
e
d
t
o
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
R
O
W
.
55A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
F
i
g
u
r
e
s
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
F
i
g
u
r
e
1
:
T
h
e
C
y
c
l
i
c
a
l
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
i
e
s
o
f
T
r
a
d
a
b
l
e
-
S
e
c
t
o
r
A
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
i
n
S
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
N
o
t
e
s
:
F
o
r
t
h
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
,
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
i
s
t
h
e
s
u
m
o
f
n
o
n
-
f
a
r
m
n
o
n
-
￿
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
,
p
e
r
s
o
n
a
l
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
o
n
d
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
,
a
n
d
h
a
l
f
o
f
p
e
r
s
o
n
a
l
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
o
n
n
o
n
-
d
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
(
o
n
l
y
h
a
l
f
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
i
t
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
s
o
m
e
n
o
n
-
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
s
a
n
d
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
)
.
F
o
r
J
a
p
a
n
,
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
i
s
t
h
e
s
u
m
o
f
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
o
n
n
e
w
p
l
a
n
t
a
n
d
e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
,
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
o
n
d
u
r
a
b
l
e
g
o
o
d
s
,
a
n
d
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
o
n
s
e
m
i
-
d
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
F
o
r
C
h
i
n
a
,
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
s
t
h
e
G
D
P
o
f
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
.
F
o
r
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
,
g
r
o
w
t
h
i
n
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
t
o
G
D
P
i
s
o
n
e
t
h
i
r
d
o
f
t
h
e
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
o
f
m
a
c
h
i
n
e
r
y
a
n
d
e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
t
o
G
D
P
p
l
u
s
t
w
o
-
t
h
i
r
d
s
o
f
t
h
e
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
o
f
r
e
t
a
i
l
s
a
l
e
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
m
o
t
o
r
v
e
h
i
c
l
e
s
a
n
d
p
e
t
r
o
l
t
o
G
D
P
.
A
l
l
s
e
r
i
e
s
a
r
e
f
r
o
m
D
a
t
a
s
t
r
e
a
m
.
W
e
n
o
t
e
t
h
a
t
e
a
c
h
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
u
r
￿
g
u
r
e
s
i
s
p
l
o
t
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
a
d
i
⁄
e
r
e
n
t
s
c
a
l
e
f
o
r
t
h
e
v
e
r
t
i
c
a
l
a
n
d
h
o
r
i
z
o
n
t
a
l
a
x
e
s
.
56A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
F
i
g
u
r
e
2
:
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
n
p
u
t
-
O
u
t
p
u
t
C
o
e
¢
c
i
e
n
t
s
(
￿
D
i
,
￿
N
i
,
￿
N
D
i
,
a
n
d
￿
N
N
i
)
N
o
t
e
s
:
I
n
p
u
t
-
O
u
t
p
u
t
c
o
e
¢
c
i
e
n
t
s
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
f
r
o
m
O
E
C
D
i
n
p
u
t
-
O
u
t
p
u
t
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
,
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
2
0
0
9
.
S
e
e
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
T
a
b
l
e
1
f
o
r
s
e
c
t
o
r
a
l
d
e
￿
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
.
￿
C
o
e
¢
c
i
e
n
t
s
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
a
s
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
b
y
o
n
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
o
n
a
n
o
t
h
e
r
￿
s
o
u
t
p
u
t
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
b
y
t
o
t
a
l
i
n
p
u
t
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
s
a
t
b
a
s
i
c
p
r
i
c
e
s
(
i
.
e
.
n
e
t
o
f
t
a
x
e
s
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
)
.
57A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
F
i
g
u
r
e
3
:
C
h
e
c
k
i
n
g
A
c
c
u
r
a
c
y
o
f
T
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
D
i
s
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
i
o
n
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
f
o
r
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
N
o
t
e
s
:
C
h
e
c
k
i
n
g
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
w
i
t
h
d
u
r
a
b
l
e
(
A
M
D
M
V
S
)
a
n
d
n
o
n
-
d
u
r
a
b
l
e
(
A
M
N
M
V
S
)
s
e
r
i
e
s
f
r
o
m
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
R
e
s
e
r
v
e
M
3
s
u
r
v
e
y
(
n
o
t
e
t
h
i
s
i
s
d
i
⁄
e
r
e
n
t
s
o
u
r
c
e
f
r
o
m
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
i
n
p
a
p
e
r
)
.
A
n
n
u
a
l
t
o
t
a
l
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
f
r
o
m
1
9
9
5
-
2
0
0
7
o
n
l
y
,
e
v
e
n
t
h
o
u
g
h
d
a
t
a
s
t
a
r
t
s
e
a
r
l
i
e
r
a
n
d
i
s
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
2
0
0
9
,
t
o
m
i
r
r
o
r
e
x
t
e
n
t
o
f
d
a
t
a
u
s
e
d
f
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
580
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
.
6
.
8
1
1
.
2
1
.
4
(
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
D
u
r
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
F
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
)
^
-
(
T
h
e
t
a
D
)
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
F
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
0
1
2
3
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
.
6
.
8
1
1
.
2
1
.
4
(
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
N
o
n
-
D
u
r
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
F
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
)
^
-
(
T
h
e
t
a
N
)
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
N
o
n
-
D
u
r
a
b
l
e
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
F
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
F
i
g
u
r
e
4
:
S
h
o
c
k
s
t
o
B
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
T
r
a
d
e
F
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
2
0
0
8
:
Q
1
t
o
2
0
0
9
:
Q
1
N
o
t
e
s
:
H
i
s
t
o
g
r
a
m
p
l
o
t
s
￿
^
d
j
n
i
￿
￿
￿
j
f
o
r
e
a
c
h
s
e
c
t
o
r
j
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
p
e
r
i
o
d
2
0
0
8
:
Q
1
t
o
2
0
0
9
:
Q
1
.
N
o
t
e
t
h
a
t
v
a
l
u
e
s
l
e
s
s
t
h
a
n
1
i
m
p
l
y
a
n
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
t
r
a
d
e
f
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
.
t
h
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
a
n
d
s
m
a
l
l
e
s
t
5
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
l
e
s
h
o
c
k
s
(
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
s
m
a
l
l
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
)
a
r
e
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
.
59